Gertrude Check

Shipmate, retired Master Chief Dave Landerman was admitted to Madigan with chest pains on Tuesday evening. Friday or Saturday he will undergo a double by-pass heart surgery.

Information for anyone who wishes to call or visit him is as follows:
            Room #217 Wing 2-South
            Madigan visiting hours are 10:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.
            Room telephone # is 1-253-968-2331

Holland Club member Bobby Baker, Life member Shane Foraker and active duty member Rocky Park recruited a new member at TTF yesterday and a few promises. Great Job.

Dutch Kaiser shares latest on German Sub 212......Hydrogen Fuel Cells

http://messdeck.com/Forum/forum_posts.asp?TID=5171

Associate Bremerton Base Life Member and Puget Soundings editor Sam Swenson was admitted to Harrison Memorial Hospital on Wed for shortness of breath and chest pains. He is on O2 and will undergo more testing today..Sam returned home with the following message to all:

Thank you Don. I have been released to go home. 1800 hr . Need rest no heart attack, but some more very small (one) blockage in the heart. No threat to the heart yet, treating with medication. In no pain and feeling better.

Could you put this out? thanks

Sam the man

Welcome aboard new member Angus MacDonald (Redfish, Salmon) recruited by Don Bassler. Also Val Keaveny (Atule, Skate, Sam Houston, James Madison) and Associate Member Margaret Keaveny recruited by Past Commander John Gardner

As many know, Base Storekeeper Tommy Robinson has really revved up of the Bremerton Base Ships Store. His sense of business has really made the store a profitable venture for the base. His enthusiasm and constant updating of products available for you to purchase is remarkable. He has even started up a webpage for the store and is taking vest orders via an order form. Please take a look here. The page is just a starter and I am sure he will have more info on it later on. His reputation has Subvets around the country ordering from him. Great job Tommy!

An international gathering of submariners in Victoria in May 2008 http://members.shaw.ca:80/saocwest/2008.htm

The Lone Sailor Statue Project Bremerton Base has forwarded a check to the Lone Sailor Statue Project for $1000. According to Co-chairman, Tim Thomson, the base will get permanent recognition. Hopefully you will consider contributing to this project's success. See Donor list here and recently updated.

USSVI-Bremerton Base Shipmates & Friends, Its here....Storekeeper's own Page

The new 2008 Subvet Calendars are available for $7.00 + $1.83 postage, total $8.83. The 2008 Calendar features 18 submarines, the loss dates for U.S. Subs together with other USN Submarine History and historic dates. It’s nicely done! Proceeds from sales supports the Lt. Willie Spoon Memorial Scholarship fund and other Base projects.

To get your calendar just send a check made out to Subvets-Bremerton Base to Base Storekeeper Tommy Robinson, 2115 Opdal Road E., Port Orchard, WA 98366. I will mail your calendar. If you perfer to save a $1.83 and can pick up your calander at either the National Office in Silverdale or the FRA in Bremerton just send a check for $7.00. I will leave a calendar with your name on it at your desired location.

If you have already purchased a calendar ... Thank You! If not, then please consider buying one ... thanks again!

Shipmates helping shipmates … It's what we're all about. Fraternally,

Tommy Robinson
USSVI-Bremerton Base - Storekeeper

NEW SKED You can still make your submarine experience count! Trident Training Center (TTF) Command Master Chief Scott Fusco and USSVI Bremerton Base Past Commander John Gardner have a program that lets you share your submarine experience and lessons learned with young sailors graduating from the TTF ET course. Each one of the classes has been named after one of the "Forty One for Freedom". On graduation day Master Chief Fusco invites a team of two Bremerton Base members (preferably that has served on that class's name sake boat) in, to give a short talk on their experiences, etc. We have been involved in two or three of these graduations to date.

Coming up on the following dates are graduating classes with the boat names with members names that served on those boats. TEAM UP! Then/or e-mail John (jgardner@donobi.net) or call him at

360-692-8994.

                      NAVET                                                               Radioman
USS Sam Houston - 15 APR 08 @ 1100                USS Ethan Allen - 04 MAR 08 @ 1100
USS John Marshall - 17 JUN 08 @ 1100                 USS Thomas A. Edison - 16 MAY 08 @ 1100
USS Alexander Hamilton - 19 AUG 08 @1100        USS Thomas Jefferson - 02 SEP 08 @ 1100
USS Andrew Jackson - 15 OCT 08 @ 1100            USS Lafayette - 10 Dec 08 @ 1100

Tribute to Today's Submarine Sailors:

I had the honor of being the guest speaker, representing the USSVI Bremerton Base, for the Electronic Technician Graduation Class (Radiomen) USS Abraham Lincoln(SSBN602) at the Trident Training Facility (TTF) Bangor on 12 December 2007.

It was a great emotional feeling seeing the bright young sailors in dress blues (the old cracker jacks) sitting in the front row intensely listening to and old 76 year old retired Chief telling them how it is was 47 years ago on the pre-commissioning crew for the Abraham Lincoln. They showed respect and complete interest in what I was saying. I looked at them and I could see all the faces of my old shipmates that were once as young and brilliant as they are.

I was very impressed with the caliber of the students in this class. They were as ready to get to their boats as I was fifty two years ago and I think they are better trained on more sophisticated hardware then I was at their age.

I will never question the ability of our young submarine volunteers to safely man our boats again. As an ex- COB I would be honored to have any one in this class aboard any submarine that I was on....We are in good hands gentlemen.

The reason the students graduating from TTF are so well trained and have such a great attitude is the quality of the training staff and the great leadership that they instill in their students. I take my hat off to every one at TTF that is involved with their training. This is why we are Submariners, to teach the young and new to be better qualified and smarter then we are.

"Dirty" Dave
Oliver Dave Davenport FTGC(SS) USN RET.

Subject: USSVI POC Broadcast : #2007-24 <Direct Link

Date: 12/31/2007
To: Distribution List

NEWS-01: Blueback Base's Best Boat
NEWS-02: Now, this ain't no S..T!
NEWS-03: A Packing Party at Dallas Base
NEWS-04: USSVI Wahoo/SVWWII Fresno do it together...
NEWS-05: U.S.S. Snook Base Honors Fallen Comrades...
NEWS-06: Greeneville's welcome at Portsmouth
NEWS-07: By the numbers!
VET-01: A Question for Mil Retirees and VA System users...
VET-02: Whazzup at the Veterans Administration?
VET-03: Whazzup at Tricare???
VET-04: Armed Forces Retirement Home-Remember Bob Spide?
VET-05: A little known Veteran benefit for low income and surviving spouses
CHARITABLE-01: Legacy Gifting by Shipmates...

Bob Neal and daughter Shari Neal, who will be South Sound Base's guest speakers at the meeting tomorrow night (Thursday, Jan 10) at 7:00 pm., Meeting at: VFW Post # 969, 3510 McKinley Ave., Tacoma, WA 98404

Bob Neal
Currently a Chief Hospital Corpsman on board the USS Jimmy Carter SSN 23
Entered the Navy in August of 1986.
USS Michigan SSBN 727 B - Bangor - Qualified in submarines Feb 1988
Corpsman School - Great Lakes - He and Shari were in the same class
Naval Hospital - Great Lakes
Naval Training Center - San Diego
Fleet Marines - Camp Pendelton
Naval Base Bangor Medical Clinic - Preventative Medician Technician (PMT)
Independant Duty Corpsman School - New London
USS Henry Jackson SSBN 730B - Bangor - Directly responsible for command receiving the Medical M
Naval Submarine Support Group - Bangor - Supported all Submarines at Bangor.
Bob plans to continue his career as long as he can.

Shari Neal
Currently a Navy wife with prior Naval experience.

She works as an Accounting Manager for a property management firm in Silverdale, WA.
Joined the Navy in Jan. 1988. She and Bob were married in August of 1988.
Her assignments while in the Navy were:
BE&E School
ET A School
Corpsman School - Great Lakes
Naval Hospital - Great Lakes
USS McKee AS41 - San Diego - Deployed to the Gulf War - Desert Storm
Branch Medical Clinic Naval Training Center - San Diego
Since she left active duty Shari has been the Ombudsman for the USS Henry Jackson (Blue) and for the Naval Submarine Support Group - Bangor.
She looks forward to becoming an Ombudsman Trainer some time

More news of submariner interest below

Don "Red" Bassler

Commander

USSVI Bremerton Base

360-479-1642

down-scope@comcast.net

Ahoy All,

The Submariners Association of Canada West current on-line Newsletter is available for your perusal ... http://members.shaw.ca/thesubmariner/07xpi.htm

Yours Aye & All The Best for 2008 !!!

Bob Emery (for SAOC West)

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The following invitation, forwarded to me by our Past President, Jim Adkins, may be of interest to our members. Please make reservations directly with Chris Chuhran.

Happy New Year!

Mal

ASNE DINNER MEETING

Thursday, January 17, 2008

PROGRAM: USS SAN FRANCISCO (SSN 711) Post-Collision, Bow Restoration

PRESENTED BY: Jeremy C. McCrimmon, Project Engineer, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility (PSNS & IMF)

SUMMARY: The USS SAN FRANCISCO (SSN 711) experienced an underwater collision with an uncharted South Pacific Seamount on 8 January, 2005 approximately 350 miles South of Guam (USA). After temporary repair, SSN 711 made an unprecedented 3700 mile surface transit across the Pacific Ocean to Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (PSNS; Bremerton, WA). PSNS was selected and tasked by the Navy to provide permanent repairs to her bow, and restore the fast-attack submarine to the Fleet with an unrestricted operations certification. Currently, SSN 711 is over half way through her availability, and success is on the horizon. This presentation will highlight the difficulties and challenges that have been overcome throughout this complex, first of a kind restoration performed by Puget Sound Naval Shipyard & Intermediate Maintenance Facility (IMF).

ABOUT THE PRESENTER: Jeremy C. McCrimmon attended Washington State University and graduated with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Civil Engineering (with emphasis in Structures). During college Jeremy obtained work experience through an Internship with the Washington State Major League Baseball Stadium Public Facilities District which conducted Quality Assurance oversight of the Hunt/Kiewet Joint Construction Venture of SAFECO Field. He was also was selected to participate in the Pacific Earthquake Engineering and Research Center (PEER), Research Experience for Undergraduates in his Senior year at Washington State University.

Upon graduation, Jeremy obtained a Structural Engineering position at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in June 2000 where he worked in the Submarine Branch. Jeremy was selected to join a fly-away team and perform damage assessment and temporary repair’s to the USS SAN FRANCISCO. In May of 2005 he was selected to the Project Engineering position for the USS SAN FRANCISCO Project.

In 2006 he graduated from the Public Management Certificate Program at Indiana University and Purdue University at Indianapolis (IUPU) and is currently enrolled in the Masters in Public Affairs program at IUPUI.

DATE: Thursday, 17 January 2008

LOCATION: Ivar’s Restaurant, Pier 54 Seattle, WA

SCHEDULE: 5:30 p.m. - Cocktails (No-host) and Registration

6:30 p.m. – Dinner Buffet

7:15 p.m. – Program

COST: $40.00 per plate

RESERVATIONS: RSVP by COB Monday, 14 January 2008. Note, seating is limited to 36 people, reserve early or there may not be a seat!

Chris Chuhran – Phone 253-229-1289, email: cdchuhran@comcast.net

Cancellations must be made by 3:30 pm the day before the event or the full cost will have to be billed.

CAPT C.A.K (“Angus”) McDonald, USN (Ret) will speak to the membership on the loss of USS SCORPION (SSN 589).

WHEN: Wednesday, January 16th, 2008 at 11:30 for lunch at noon.

WHERE: Bangor Plaza, Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor

COST: $12 at the door. Please consider contributing an extra $12 to go toward our fund for active duty submariners (LT and below) at lunch. Please note that this really helps our chapter defray the cost of having members of individual ships Wardrooms and CPO Quarters to our monthly meetings as our guests. Hosting our active duty shipmates gives tremendous support to increasing name recognition for the Naval Submarine League among active duty submariners and submarine supporters. Many, many thanks to those of you who have contributed to this initiative in the past.

MENU: Chef’s Choice Buffet

RESERVATIONS: Make reservations with Melissa Smith at 360 377 2814 or E-mail her at Melissa.c.Smith@saic.com by close of business on Friday, January 11th, 2008

SPOUSES AND FRIENDS OF THE SUBMARINE FORCE ARE WELCOME AND ENCOURAGED TO ATTEND:

C.A.K (Angus) McDonald

CAPT, USN (Ret)

Angus McDonald graduated from the US Naval Academy in 1947. He then served for seven years in destroyers and submarines before attending the US Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. After receiving a Master’s Degree in Electrical Engineering in 1957, he served in submarine and staff assignments for four years before taking command of USS BARBERO (SS 317), a REGULUS-Missile equipped submarine. Following a year in command he was selected for nuclear power training, after which he commanded the POLARIS submarine USS ULYSSES S. GRANT (SSBN 731). Angus served as Special Assistant for Submarines to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 1967 to 1970. Before leaving active duty in 1973, he commanded the Submarine Training Center Pacific, with Headquarters on Ford Island. During his naval service, he was awarded the Legion of Merit, the Meritorious Service Medal and several theater and campaign ribbons. After retiring from the Navy, he worked in the civilian nuclear power industry for ten years.

More recently, Angus published an article entitled “Real Story of Scorpion?” in the June 1999 edition of the Naval Institute Proceedings. He has given several talks about the tragedy in subsequent years-the most recent on October 24th aboard the Carnival cruise ship CELEBRATION during a reunion of USS GRANT shipmates

The Sculpin's Lost Mission: A Nuclear Submarine in the Vietnam War

By Admiral Charles R. Larson, U.S. Navy (Retired), with Captain Clinton Wright, U.S. Navy (Retired), and Paul Stillwell

One would expect that Cold War "special ops" involving U.S. nuclear-powered submarines are shrouded in secrecy. Other American sub activities during that era, however, are also hidden, one for a very strange reason.

In 1971, after he had spent two and a half years of duty in the White House as naval aide to President Richard Nixon, Commander Chuck Larson was ready to go back to sea. He was ordered to be executive officer of the attack submarine Sculpin (SSN-590), under Commander Harry Mathis. For several months the boat went through workups off the coast of southern California to prepare for a deployment to the western Pacific. That deployment included active participation in the Vietnam War.

After leaving the West Coast in January 1972, our first assignment was a classified special operation that lasted about two months. It went very well. The mission helped us hone our ship-handling and intelligence-gathering skills, and made us confident in our capabilities, and feel good about the way the ship was operating. Although it is still classified after all these years, it's safe to say that it was intelligence-gathering targeted against the Soviet Union.

Years later, Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew's book, Blind Man's Bluff (New York: Public Affairs, 1998), described Cold War submarine operations. Because of security concerns, I can't specifically discuss the contents, but the book is a good read.

After the special operation, the Sculpin went into Yokosuka, Japan, for some liberty, and my wife, Sally, met me there. I had grown my beard while at sea and that, combined with my black hair and pale complexion after the extended period underwater, made me look-according to Sally-like Rasputin, the mad tsarist Russian.

In March, shortly after we began our second operation, patrolling the South China Sea, we were diverted for a specific mission. The U.S. government believed supply trawlers were operating out of Hainan Island, off the southern coast of the People's Republic of China. They were running arms, ammunition, and supplies from the northern part of the Gulf of Tonkin down to the Vietcong in the IV Corps region, the southernmost portion of Vietnam. U.S. forces discovered this when ground troops caught the enemy in the act of off-loading a trawler on a South Vietnamese beach. The incident sparked a big firefight, creating the legend that the trawler crews were elite forces willing to fight to the death. It also initiated a concerted effort to stop the traffic by convincing the enemy that it could not succeed.

Each of the trawlers could carry about 100 tons of munitions. Several suspect ships were photographed, so we knew generally what they looked like, but as long as they were in international waters, we had no means to interdict them other than to turn them around by making low passes with a P-3 Orion patrol plane or a close approach by a surface ship. This was complicated by the fact that so many legitimate trawlers like them were in the area. Several gunrunners had been turned around, but this would not stop the at-sea resupply effort.

To convincingly discourage the effort, it would be necessary to destroy them in the waters off South Vietnam before they could land their cargo. The plan that evolved was to use a submarine to follow one from Hainan to South Vietnam and finger it for our forces to destroy. We were selected for this mission.

The Pursuit Begins

We took up a patrol station off Hainan on 10 April. After referring to a book with images of the different types of trawlers and what we could expect, we picked up our quarry on 12 April. The wardroom was divided on whether she was a good prospect. However, the ship resembled photographs of other known suspects, and her projected track was taking her toward the west coast of the Philippines, which did not make sense for a fisherman. So we took off in trail. Not long thereafter, the trawler turned to the south, and that was the clincher for us. She had an extremely distinctive shaft rub and propeller sound, which our sonarmen could easily discriminate from background noise. We relied completely on passive sonar to avoid being detected. The active sonar in the Skipjack-class submarines wouldn't have been reliable because of the reverberations in shallow water.

The ship we followed was probably 200 feet long, a large trawler, certainly suitable for open-ocean fishing. We did, of course, identify her by periscope before we started to trail, but we weren't able to follow her totally by periscope and maintain visual contact. We didn't want to take the chance of having our periscope seen in the flat, calm waters of the South China Sea. Also, she was making a speed of advance through the water of about 11 knots. That meant that if we were going to do our periscope operations every now and then, get out radio messages, and do our required housekeeping evolutions, we were probably going to have to run an average of about 18 or 20 knots submerged to keep up with her. We also had to include time for ocean analysis and tactical maneuvering to make certain we were staying with the correct target.

One more challenge was that the trawler was heading south, right through the "dangerous ground." On charts of the South China Sea, an area about 180 nautical miles wide and 300 miles long is simply labeled dangerous ground. Our charts had one track of soundings through that area-taken in 1885. We assessed that the terrain was fairly level, but the depth was 200 feet or less in most of this area. So we were in a position of running up to 20 knots in 200 feet of water, with between 30 to 80 feet under the keel at that high speed. Our ship could react very quickly to plane (control surface) movements, so we had only our most experienced officers of the deck, diving officers, and planesmen on station. Our chief petty officer diving officers controlled the ship's depth by supervising the planesmen. They did a superb job.

As the trawler headed south, she vectored a little to the east and went into an area in the dangerous ground where we couldn't go. Up to then, although we were in the dangerous area, we felt secure in knowing the bottom was fairly level. But now she went into an area that was littered with rocks, shoals, and shipwrecks. I wondered then if the trawler's crew was smart enough to do what we called a "sanitization move"-go where even surface ships wouldn't follow. She doubtlessly believed that if she went through there she would come out the other side well clear of any tailing vessel.

I was absolutely convinced that the trawler was unaware of our presence (that became clear later when we intercepted a radio message). We believed the ship's course change was simply a safety move. While we were able to use our fathometer to plot the bottom and know the depth under our keel, the device looks only directly down; it doesn't look ahead. We were genuinely worried about what we couldn't see ahead-an undersea mountain, a wreck, or something else.

Lost and Found

When the trawler had entered the dangerous ground, we requested cover from an on-call P-3 Orion. Although we were under the operational control of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) in Saigon , we had the ability to call the shots on the scene. We wanted the aircraft to remain covert, so it would not scare the trawler back into port by making low passes near her. During the ship's voyage through this very shallow, wreck-strewn portion of the dangerous ground, the plane, remaining at high altitude to minimize the chance of being seen, kept track of her by radar and visual observation. We dodged around the area by hauling off to the west, then south, and finally back to the east, to an area where we predicted the trawler would emerge, still in the dangerous ground. As the P-3 turned the contact over to us, the trawler appeared just about where we thought she would. We picked her up from the distinctive shaft rub and propeller sound and got in close enough to get a good positive periscope observation. We then went back in trail.

As we headed south in the South China Sea, we approached a new hazard. We found a large number of oil-drilling platforms near the coast of Borneo. We first became aware of this hazard through the prolonged tracking of a diesel contact, which prompted the CO, Commander Harry Mathis, to go up to periscope depth for a look. We spotted an uncharted platform. If the rigs were operating, that was no problem; we could plot the location of their noisy diesel engines. We found some charted, some not, some operating and others not.

Our concern, of course, was about those uncharted and not running. We made frequent periscope observations to avoid the platforms, which forced us to run faster to maintain the quarry's speed of advance. We continued south at higher speeds for longer periods of time, sometimes with barely 20 to 30 feet of water beneath the Sculpin's keel.

As our target passed between the Great Natuna Islands, we made an end run around North Natuna. After that, our quarry was on a beeline for the Gulf of Thailand, passing through the busy sea-lane between Hong Kong and Singapore. The density of the large shipping traffic in this lane was incredible. Crossing it was like running across a busy freeway. It was night time, and sonar was useless amid all the traffic noise, so we crossed at periscope depth following our quarry's stern light, maneuvering to avoid the large ships bearing down on us from both directions.

The Gulf of Thailand presented a new challenge. The water was hot, 86 degrees Fahrenheit, and shallow, averaging 110 feet deep, and the bottom was flat. The surface was a dead calm mirror with fishing buoys and nets everywhere, not to mention small fishing boats of every description. It was also very hazy and so hot that the horizon was somewhat obscure. Such were the wartime circumstances that our operation order authorized us to operate in water as shallow as six fathoms. Who says nuclear-powered submarines can't operate in the littorals?

How Invisible?

During this time we half-jokingly talked about "the hump." We were trying to visualize what the Sculpin looked like on the surface, running at 20 knots, with maybe only 40 feet from the top of the sail to the surface. We visualized a hump-the water displaced above the boat's hull-roaring through the South China Sea like a mini tidal wave, with observers wondering what it was. We assumed the ship left some sort of trail but were certain one would have to be very close to be able to see it.

An incident when I had command duty got my attention. I brought the Sculpin up to periscope depth and saw what I thought was a periscope going by. My first reaction was, "Holy smoke, there's another submarine up here." Then I realized it was a small water-saturated log that was floating vertically. Just for a moment I thought there were two submarines staring at each other and wondered which one was going to blink first.

As the trawler moved farther south, she made a distinct turn to the west and then to the northwest. We were absolutely sure she was a gunrunner, going in to land and off-load her ammunition. Then, two things happened. We were ordered by MACV to photograph our target and alerted to prepare to execute a provision in our operation order for us to sink our target with torpedoes.

The photographic mission meant leaving our trail position and speeding up ahead of the target to take pictures as the trawler cruised by. The risk of detection was great because of the flat calm sea and our hump as we repositioned at high speed. To avoid this, we had to go as deep as possible. Commander Mathis selected 90 feet keel depth, leaving 20 feet between the keel and the bottom. We limited periscope exposure to 6 inches for less than ten seconds. We did get good pictures and apparently were not detected, although one photograph revealed three men on deck looking in our general direction. The depth control skill of our diving officer chiefs was extraordinary.

Where'd She Go?

Immediately after the trawler made the northwest turn, and just before we communicated with higher authorities, we lost contact for about two hours. Up to that point, our target had been somewhat predictable, cruising on a straight course to the northwest near the center of the Gulf of Thailand about 100 miles off the coast of South Vietnam, with the familiar shaft rub being tracked by sonar. It was night with a full moon, and we saw her lights through the periscope. The horizon was indistinguishable. Suddenly, sonar reported she had stopped, and while the CO watched, the trawler turned off her lights. Blind and deaf, we then lit off the radar and made several sweeps that revealed nothing. This was not too surprising. When a radar hasn't been used in months and is not tuned, taking it out and rotating it a couple of times doesn't guarantee a high probability of picking up a small target. We were not sure whether she had stopped for the night or was moving away in a new direction at slow speed. We reported the lost contact, which threw the operational command authority in Saigon into a panic. They had been moving South Vietnamese naval forces along the coast to maintain a blocking position based on our updates, so the whole operation threatened to unravel. Commander Mathis and I huddled and decided: "Well, we've got to assume that she's making a run toward the border up there. Let's just go down and run as fast as we can and get about 30 miles ahead of her predicted track and set up a barrier."

So we moved up and waited for her farther up into the Gulf of Thailand. We made that sprint at 20 knots with 20 feet under the keel. At first daylight, we contacted our on station P-3 aircraft and described our quarry, particularly her white color. We requested that the Orion's crew search the area from where we lost contact to the Vietnamese coast. They reported several widely separated contacts; only one of them was white. The CO authorized a low-altitude identification pass, and the P-3 made a positive ID. They reported to Saigon, and we closed the target. As we neared, we regained that familiar shaft rub and when we took another periscope look, it was her-positive identification, both sonar and visual.

Originally, MACV requested authorization for us to sink the target with our torpedoes, but this was not approved. For years I assumed that the National Command Authority in Washington, D.C., disapproved the request. However, several years later, Harry Mathis, who by then was a captain, was commanding officer of the Submarine Base Pearl Harbor. He regularly played tennis with retired Admiral Bernard "Chick" Clarey, who had been commander-in-chief Pacific Fleet at the time of our operation. Admiral Clarey remembered the operation very well because he and Admiral John McCain, commander-in-chief Pacific, had followed our progress closely in daily briefings. Admiral Clarey told Mathis that he had argued vehemently in favor of having us shoot, but Admiral McCain was not convinced it would work. Instead, South Vietnamese naval forces were called in to do the job on 24 April.

High-Seas Drama

The surface forces-led by a South Vietnamese destroyer escort-challenged the trawler, which hoisted a Chinese flag and an international flag signal designating they were fishing. The South Vietnamese commander was hesitant to take action because he was concerned about creating an international incident. Fortunately, we established communications with the U.S. liaison officer on board the destroyer with the UQC underwater telephone. His first question was whether we could verify this ship as our trawler. We told him, "Absolutely, this is the one without a doubt." We then went to periscope depth to observe.

The trawler tried to convince the South Vietnamese destroyer that she was an innocent fishing vessel. We spoke once again with the liaison officer and with higher authorities and said: "We are absolutely sure that this ship came out of Hainan flying a PRC (People's Republic of China) flag. We have tracked her 2,500 miles to this position, and in our opinion she is a gunrunner making a run toward the border and certainly is not a fisherman. We can verify who she is, which should allow us to take whatever action is appropriate."

As we later learned from the intercepted communication, the trawler at one point said, "I think there is a submarine out there." This was the first indication that the trawler crew was aware of us as we coordinated with the destroyer. Based on our identification, the destroyer escort ordered the trawler to stop, and when she failed to comply, began making intimidating runs at her, finally opening fire from a standoff position with her 3-inch guns. The trawler was hit and began burning, running in a circle as if the rudder was jammed hard over.

We watched through the periscope, and our crew gathered in their mess to watch on the TV monitor. Suddenly, with a thunderous roar, clearly audible through the Sculpin's hull, the trawler exploded and disintegrated as its cargo detonated. Flames leaped hundreds of feet in the air, accompanied by the cheers of our crew.

At this moment, Commander Mathis asked the crew over the 1MC for a moment of silence. Enemy or not, they had perished doing their mission. Later, we were pleased to learn that 16 of the trawler crew had been rescued and they spoke Vietnamese, not Chinese. The captain and the navigator were among them and able to provide valuable intelligence about their operations. One of the few casualties was the political officer.

Our communication with command headquarters, through the loitering Orion during the urgent final search, was vital. Only later did we learn that, because of atmospheric conditions, the communications link with Saigon consisted of the P-3 aircraft on station relaying to another P-3 revving up its engines on the ground at its airbase while parked next to a phone booth. A flight crew member would run out to the phone and relay the messages between Saigon and us.

One other significant factor made the mission possible. It could only have been done by a nuclear-powered submarine. That experience gave me great admiration for the diesel-boat crews and skippers of World War II. We had more margin for error than they did because of their speed limitations owing to low battery capacity. If we made a mistake on the Sculpin, we could make it up through speed and repositioning, which couldn't be done with a diesel boat. Certainly our speed came in handy, not only in the basic trail, trying to stay up with a ship doing 11 knots and do all the things we had to do, but also during that period when we lost them. We were able to run quickly forward, reposition up the track, and get a chance to pick them up again. But that blackout period was a low point. We had trailed the ship 2,300 miles and thought we'd lost her.

Hidden Valor

The trawler's crew verified that their ship was a gunrunner. They had on board enough arms and ammunition to supply the Vietcong in IV Corps for at least 60 days. Her destruction thus made a significant contribution to the safety of U.S. and South Vietnamese troops in the area and set back the enemy's military operations there.

The surviving crew were North Vietnamese. They were split up, with U.S. and South Vietnamese intelligence each interrogating half and their stories compared. It was determined that the navigator's responses were credible because he provided interrogators with exactly the same track we plotted.

The United States learned much about the North Vietnamese at-sea resupply strategy. It also learned that the trawler crews were not elite forces that would resist until death. One engineer told of being at his station when the political officer came to the engine room hatch, told him the enemy had arrived, and ordered him to stay at his post. The engineer, no doubt considering the nature of the cargo, said, "I immediately went on deck and jumped into the water."

It was an unusual operation. We spent more time submerged inside the 100-fathom curve than any U.S. submarine since World War II. Crew training, equipment reliability, ship control, navigation, sonar, communications, propulsion plant-everything and everyone performed superbly. We could not have asked for anything more. For that operation the Sculpin earned the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry, the only U.S. submarine during the entire Vietnam War to receive that award.

The Sculpin was also nominated for the submarine combat patrol pin, and our individual awards for the combat "V." If that had been approved, she would have been the first submarine since World War II to get the combat patrol pin. Instead, the nomination was disapproved somewhere up the chain of command. I assume it was probably rejected by a World War II submariner who thought the operation wasn't nearly as hazardous as what he did during his war, and it didn't measure up. I can't argue with that, but the crew had great hope that they could proudly wear the pin for their contribution, particularly to the safety of our troops. Another consideration, however, might have been that those pins would have raised questions and possibly compromised an operation that was still classified.

We covered a huge distance in trail during that operation. Someone asked me later how I slept at night. I said, "With a pillow under my head, up against the bulkhead in case we hit something."

Admiral Larson went on to serve on active duty for 40 years. His senior position was as commander-in-chief of all United States military forces in the Pacific. Captain Wright served 26 years on active duty. He was commanding officer of USS Puffer (SSN-652) and operations officer for Commander Submarine Group Seven. Mr. Stillwell, the former editor of Naval History and the U.S. Naval Institute Oral History Program, has written the "Looking Back" column since 1993.

Cold War Records

This article is the result of merging my notes and recollections with those of Clint Wright, who stood a good many watches as Sculpin's officer of the deck during the pursuit of the trawler. Clint also gained access to the unclassified versions of the submarine's deck logs. Other OODs during the operation included Lieutenants Dick Snaider, Jim Gabala, Alan Beam, and Charlie Krupnick.

Getting our joint account through security review was an interesting challenge. Clint's original motive was to publish an article, because he wanted the Sculpin Sailors to get credit for what they did. My motive was to try and get it cleared for my oral history, so at least part of our special operations could be made public to my family and to other interested people. We jointly pursued this effort, dealing with the director of Naval Intelligence and several people who used to work for me. The first thing we discovered was that there were absolutely no records of the Sculpin's operations. They had all been destroyed.

This highlights weaknesses in the Naval Intelligence Command's record keeping. As far as we can determine, the Navy had its standard Cold War intelligence gathering, what we called "special operations," which were classified and compartmentalized. Those reports appear to have been preserved. But because the Sculpin's Vietnam operation was not in that category-it was a more conventional, although extremely unusual, operation and didn't have the protection of that system-the reports were purged at some point when the government discarded old records. There is just no official record of this operation.

In putting this story together and sending it forward for clearance by the Navy Department, I think we did a double service. We not only got it cleared so those who served in the Sculpin during this time can receive credit, but we made this operation public and prevented it from being lost forever. At some point, an old Sculpin Sailor would have wanted to talk about it, and there would have been no way to find the records. So I'm very pleased that we were able to do that for our fine crew.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Butler, JD [mailto:jd.butler@lmco.com]
Sent: Wednesday, January 09, 2008 8:22 AM
Subject: Chinese Evaluations Of The U.S. Navy Submarine Force; By Gabriel Collins, Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, Naval War College Review, January 2008

Chinese Evaluations Of The U.S. Navy Submarine Force

By Gabriel Collins, Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, Naval War College Review, January 2008

The U.S. Navy submarine force has set the standard in undersea warfare for at least half a century. America’s submarines made a vital contribution to victory in the Second World War, and they formed an elite force of truly innovative capabilities during the “Cold War at sea” with the Soviet Navy. Since the end of the Cold War, the submarine force has been a leader among U.S. military war-fighting communities in transforming itself to remain relevant against militant Islamist extremism and other emerging threats.

In such missions, the submarine force conducts strategic deterrence, intelligence and surveillance, extended-range land attack, and insertion of special forces, in addition to forming the essential backbone of the Navy’s mission of sea control – the all-important, enabling task of maintaining command of the seas for the U.S. armed forces. With the launch of the first of the Virginia class in 2003, the Navy’s position at the forefront of global submarine forces was set for the foreseeable future.

Perhaps partly inspired by the great successes of the U.S. submarine force, navies around the world have invested heavily in undersea warfare, especially in submarine capabilities. China stands out among these as an emerging submarine power. Over the last decade, Beijing has been building four different classes of boats while importing the Kilo-class diesel submarine from Russia in large numbers. Indeed, China’s intense focus on undersea warfare has led some to speculate that a transpacific rivalry is already under way, at least with respect to submarine capabilities. As policy makers in Washington grapple with the challenge of China’s rise, therefore, it may be wise to consider how Beijing is approaching its evolving naval strategy dilemmas. This article examines Chinese views of the American submarine force. As that submarine force constitutes one of the most vital elements of Washington’s overall strategy for establishing and maintaining sea control in times of conflict, Beijing’s assessment of those capabilities may be critical to uncovering the future evolution of this nascent rivalry.

More specifically, then, this research was undertaken for three reasons:

· The U.S. Navy submarine force is thought to represent a key capability for conflict scenarios involving China.

· This part of the U.S. Navy has undertaken major efforts at transformation within a new geostrategic and technological environment.

· The American submarine force represents a rather well-defined warfare area and thus lends itself to a bounded research effort.

Over the last decade, there has been an explosion of publishing in China on all subjects, including strategic and military-technical research. Thus, there are at least five serious journals devoted to naval warfare and dozens of more technically oriented journals.1 In this project, well over a thousand Chinese articles were surveyed, of which approximately 150 were judged worthy of closer scrutiny and analysis by the research team. The danger of circularity – attributing to Chinese analysts ideas that have simply been translated from original English-language sources into Chinese – is real, but one that the research team carefully considered throughout. Most Chinese journals now openly attribute English-language articles to their original sources. By and large, this kind of material (direct translation from English) was not evaluated in this study, in favor of articles that appeared to represent the actual opinions of Chinese naval and defense analysts.

This article is divided into five parts. The first section surveys Chinese reactions to a variety of current issues in the U.S. submarine force, including recent deployments and incidents of special interest. A second section examines Chinese evaluations of specific submarine force capabilities, focusing especially on new factors (e.g., the development of SSGNs) that have been central to transformation efforts. Section three considers some critical historical issues, particularly Chinese perceptions of U.S. submarine operations during the Cold War. A fourth section considers how Chinese analysts believe their antisubmarine forces would match up against the U.S. submarine force. Section five reviews Chinese perceptions regarding the overall future trajectory of the U.S. submarine force. A conclusion summarizes the article and offers policy recommendations.

Overall, this article finds that Chinese naval analysts study the U.S. submarine force in excruciating detail, as concretely manifested in thousands of both strategic and technical articles that focus on it.2 As one Chinese naval analyst puts it, “Nuclear attack subs are the most worthwhile weapons investments because they are the most survivable weapons platforms.... During a regional conflict, [U.S.] nuclear attack submarines are the first in and last out.”3 Nevertheless, there is also a keen appreciation that the U.S. Navy is focusing primarily on ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Writing in the official PLA journal (Modern Navy), one analysis declares, “The U.S. Navy’s capabilities to wage war at sea are gradually declining, and open ocean warfare is already not a focal point.”4 Recognizing the potentially major role of the U.S. submarine force in China contingencies, another analyst suggests: “On the basis of a great quantity of research, the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] believes that U.S. nuclear submarines are very quiet, and difficult to discover and counterattack; at the same time, [their] attack power is great, [and] must [be] restrain[ed].”5 Such assessments underline the importance of a closer examination of Chinese perspectives concerning the American submarine force.

Current Developments

In order to give a sense of what Chinese analysts believe to be the trajectory of U.S. submarine force development, it is useful to examine their assessments of two significant recent events: the grounding of the Los Angeles–class submarine USS San Francisco (SSN 711) and the stationing of nuclear-powered submarines on Guam.

The Grounding of the USS San Francisco

The collision of San Francisco with an underwater mountain on 8 January 2005 greatly interested China’s naval press. The articles published then, which prominently feature official U.S. photos of the damaged vessel, express admiration that a submarine that received such damage could have returned to port. This respect is couched in terms of the fundamental strength designed and built into the ship, however, not in terms of the critical factors of crew training and damage control. Author Qi Yaojiu, for example, wrote approximately four months after the incident in a typical article, “In order to investigate battle damage strength, the U.S. undertook strength tests [for submarines] under the conditions of nuclear weapons detonation.” Additionally, “almost every U.S. submarine, before entering into active service, undergoes tests that use underwater explosives to evaluate resistance to battle damage.”6

Notwithstanding this apparent respect, the author recognized that the damage San Francisco incurred would have amounted to a “mission kill,” stating: “If the San Francisco collision had occurred during wartime, and crew members had experienced such wounds, the San Francisco would essentially lose its basic combat effectiveness.”7 A realization that submarines do not have to be destroyed in order to lose combat effectiveness could influence Chinese operational calculations.

Also characteristic of Chinese discussions of San Francisco’s grounding is an undercurrent of bewilderment, asking in effect, “Why were they going so fast?” The tone of analysis implies that such a high-speed transit is somewhat reckless. Thus, one Chinese analyst states that “a nuclear submarine in the process of underwater high speed transit is confronting serious danger” and that “even some U.S. Navy officials expressed that they could not understand the incident.”8 Another author declares, “It is well known in all navies that as soon as a submarine enters international waters in order to protect its stealth, the submarine will not rely on its active sonar. Objectively speaking, a submarine at high speed that is not operating its active sonar is in danger comparable to a vehicle without headlights traveling in the pitch dark.”9 Perhaps because China’s submarine force consists primarily of diesel submarines that rarely make high-speed, long-distance transits, the circumstances surrounding the collision seem peculiar to Chinese naval analysts.

Chinese analyses of the San Francisco incident recognize the United States as a world leader in submarine rescue.10 As one author observes, “Overall, the USN employs the best submarine rescue vehicles and has the most extensive exercises, so its submarine rescue capability leads the world.”11 This appraisal is corroborated in Modern Navy: “Over the last few years, the U.S. Navy has continuously explored submarine rescue methods, and thus strengthened international cooperation, enhancing submarine rescue exercises with its allies. For us this represents a certain inspiration.” Moreover, the Chinese author states, “small groups at various bases are alternatively ready for war or ready to go out and undertake the rescue of an American or allied submarine at any time.”12 Even though the Chinese navy evidently has extreme respect for the U.S. submarine force, the analyses of the San Francisco incident appear to show awareness that even this elite force can make errors and must invest in cutting-edge rescue technologies.

SSNs in Apra Harbor

As might be expected, China’s naval press has watched the military buildup on Guam with great interest, particularly that of the American submarines.13 A 2004 article in Modern Navy suggests, “The U.S. Navy has stationed three nuclear-powered Los Angeles–class attack submarines on Guam. At present, the U.S. military has considered dispatching an additional 6 nuclear submarines.... Deployment of such weapons would give the U.S. military considerable capacity to ‘gain the initiative by striking first’ at us from the sea.”14

The same journal a year later described the basing of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) on Guam in greater detail, observing that the United States officially reestablished Submarine Squadron 15 on Guam under Submarine Group 7 in February 2001 and deployed three nuclear-powered attack submarines there: the first and second in fall 2002 and the third in summer 2004. Moreover, as administered by Commander, Submarine Force Pacific, the submarine group “on the basis of troop deployment plans regularly dispatches 4–5 submarines under its 7th fleet jurisdiction. The duty period of these submarines is ordinarily 6 months. Each submarine can execute missions independently, or can attach to a carrier battle group.”15

The operational significance of stationing SSNs on Guam is not lost on Chinese naval analysts. One observes that “if [a submarine] sets out from Guam, especially in a Taiwan Strait crisis, it may only require 2 days or so.”16 A significant finding of the present study is that even in official journals, Chinese analysts are exploring Guam’s vulnerabilities. The same author notes that Guam, in addition to conferring some advantages to the United States in a Taiwan crisis, also carries self-defense vulnerabilities having strategic implications:

The U.S. military has still not established a defense system of anti-aircraft, antimissile, and other defense systems on Guam—[there exists] only a pittance of coastal patrol forces. Once there are hostilities, Guam’s defense can only rely on the U.S. Navy’s sea-based missile defense system and Air Force joint operations. Consequently, in wartime, Guam’s defense is still a problem; also, because it is in a special position surrounded on four sides by ocean at the intersection of three major international sea lanes, it is impossible to defend effectively. If the other side’s long-range ballistic missiles, submarine-launched cruise missiles, long-range bombers or maritime special forces operations units, etc., can break through Guam’s peripheral warning and defense, [to] destroy or seriously damage its naval port, airfield, munitions warehouse, and communications system, [then] the entire operational system of America in the Pacific Theater can become ineffective, its sustained warfare capability can greatly fall short of requirements [and] its resolution and dynamics of military intervention would have to change.17

Regardless of the validity of their specific claims, then, it is clear that some Chinese analysts perceive Guam to be vulnerable to offensive attacks.

U.S. Navy Capabilities

Having set the scene by reviewing major submarine force developments noted by Chinese analysts, we now turn to a more comprehensive survey of the major American capabilities that have attracted their attention. These include nuclear-powered cruise missile–armed submarines (SSGNs) and Tomahawk cruise missiles, Trident submarines, fast attack submarines, sensors and systems, and research and development.

SSGNs and Tomahawks

Chinese analyses demonstrate interest in the Navy’s four new SSGNs, their conversion from Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarines, and their mission areas.18 A fairly typical article observes that refitting focal points are refitting the first 1–2 of 24 ballistic missile launch tubes for the use of special forces; tubes 3–10 into special forces use or for Tomahawk cruise missiles; [and] tubes 11–24 for Tomahawk cruise missiles. After refitting, the submarine can carry 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles, and 66 special forces personnel, a dock/shipyard cover, a frogman transport ship (SDV), and an advanced Seal Transport System (ASDS).19

Although they clearly recognize the potential value of an SSGN’s embarked special operations forces, Chinese analysts appear to be much more impressed by the implications of one SSGN’s potentially large inventory of Tomahawk cruise missiles and the high readiness rate that SSGNs will be able to maintain. One perceptive article observes that these features will allow other ships to focus on different mission areas:

After being refitted, SSGNs will be deployed 65% of the time each year on average.... As such, the USN will always have at least 2 SSGNs ready for battle at any time, and in wartime, 1 SSGN can take over the duties of many attack submarines and surface ships. Once the SSGN goes into service, this will significantly reduce the land attack burden shouldered by