The commanding officer of the attack submarine Buffalo was fired Dec. 20 over what sources said was a series of problems that left the Guam-based boat out of commission.

Cmdr. Christopher Henry was relieved just four months after taking command of the Guam-based sub. The move was a precautionary measure resulting from a "loss of confidence in ability to command," said Lt. Cmdr. Greg Kuntz, spokesman for Submarine Group 7 in Japan. The decision followed shipboard evaluations of operations and overall trends.

"We found this problem before it became a significant issue," Kuntz said.

The decision by Capt. Doug Wright, commodore of Submarine Squadron 15, to remove Henry was not attributable to a specific item or incident, and operations had been conducted at a safe level, Kuntz said. But "[t]he conduct of operations fell short of high Navy standards."

Henry, who sources said was well liked and respected by many peers and subordinates, had little to say when contacted by Navy Times.

"Any judgment into my character or leadership should include the evaluations of the crew of Buffalo or shipmates who have observed my performance from my previous commands," he said. "I have no comment at this time into the decision made on my removal from command."

In addition to Henry, another crew member has been relieved, according to Lt. Cmdr. David Benham, a spokesman for Naval Submarine Forces Pacific. He would not identify the individual, citing privacy rights. Henry has not been charged with any offense, nor has he received nonjudicial punishment, Benham said.

That Buffalo had problems is not in dispute. But sources familiar with the situation question whether Henry should bear the brunt of the blame. Specifically, they said, there was a lack of situational awareness during the inport loading of variable ballast, which is water distributed between forward and aft tanks to maintain desired trim. A "valve line-up problem" resulted in water filling to the deckplate, resulting in a saltwater intrusion of the diesel engine. In addition, maintenance failures ruined motor generator and reactor cooling pump components, they said. As a result, a scheduled Operational Reactor Safeguard Examination, or ORSE, will occur at the pier.

"If you have to do an ORSE at the pier, you're already behind the eight ball," said a retired sub commander with knowledge of the matter who asked to remain anonymous. "If it's due to a maintenance problem you caused, it's hard to see around that eight ball."

A sub wouldn't leave the pier if a motor generator or diesel is down. In the event of a reactor shut-down, those components provide backup power until it can be restarted. The diesel is also used for emergency ventilation.

A second source said that while the commander is ultimately responsible, Henry was given a crew with "known issues" and some - specifically chiefs and department heads - failed in their duties, as well.

"If you have water up to the deckplates, there are a number of people not doing their job," said an active duty submarine officer who is familiar with Buffalo's problems but was not authorized to speak on the record. "The propulsion plant isn't manned with seamen recruits. You have nothing less than petty officers in there who should know better."

That may be, according to the anonymous retired sub commander. But Henry's judgment in handling those issues could have been at the heart of his dismissal.

"If your decisions are drifting, you'll' get some rudder orders to get back on course," the former sub commander said. "You don't get fired the first time.

"This doesn't look like one mistake, but rather a collection of errors. What must be determined now is whether the individuals had proper training, whether they understood their orders and whether they were properly supervised."

How long this problem existed and how the previous skipper, Cmdr. Scott Pappano, may have handled it are not clear. During the change of command ceremony, Wright, the commodore, said he "would gladly serve under [Pappano] in combat," describing him as "exactly what the submarine force needs in a senior leader."

Kuntz said there are no safety issues with Buffalo, and Wright has "complete confidence" in the ship, which earned the Submarine Squadron 15 Battle "E" for 2008 under Pappano's command.

Henry took command Aug. 7, calling it "the greatest day in my naval career so far." The Ridgefield, Conn., native was commissioned April 13, 1990, and graduated from the University of Maryland in 1991 with a bachelor 'of science in aerospace engineering. He spent 17 years in the submarine community, including tours as executive officer of Los Angeles, engineer on Albuquerque and electrical assistant on Trepang.

Henry was replaced by Cmdr. Michael Lewis, who was a deputy commander at Squadron 15. Henry has been temporarily reassigned to Squadron 15 until the Navy determines his next job.

Henry was the 15th commanding officer - and third sub skipper - fired this year

The U.S. Navy had discovered that the training it gives it's submarine crews is sometime not keeping up with the complexity of new equipment. Case in point is the recent collision between the submarine USS Hartford and an American amphibious ship. The sub was at periscope depth, and the men on the bridge had been tracking the amphibious ship for nearly an hour. But the sonar data, and the automatic identification signals being received from another ship (moving in the same direction as the LPD, and apparently confused with the LPD) led the crew to ignore the sonar data indicating an imminent collision. The navy investigation of the incident blamed specific crew members for allowing the collision to happen, but also noted that there were a lot of sensors involved, and the navy procedures did not clearly deal with what you should do when conflicting data is being received. Nuclear subs rarely spend this much time near the surface, and have lots more sensors to detect what's above, and around the sub. Even the periscope is a much more complex instrument, containing radar and image manipulation devices, along with the traditional visual information. The conclusion was that, without some new types of training, it's too easy to become confused by the flood of data. This, in part, was one of the causes of the Hartford accident.

The accident itself consisted of a 24,000 ton amphibious ship (the USS New Orleans, LPD 18) colliding with the submerged Hartford (a 7,000 ton Lost Angeles class boat), in the narrow Straits of Hormuz, at 1 AM, local time. Fifteen sailors aboard the sub were injured, while a fuel tank on the LPD was torn open, and 25,000 gallons of fuel oil got into the water. The Hartford rolled 85 degrees right after the collision, and substantial damage was done to the sail, including a leak.

The captain and chief of the boat (senior NCO) were dismissed shortly after the March 20 collision. The Hartford went to a Persian Gulf shipyard for emergency repairs (a metal brace for the sail, which was twisted so that it leaned to the right). Temporary decking, railing and antennas were added to the topside of the sub, to make it easier for the surface ride home.

Initially, the accident was blamed on sloppy leadership by the captain, and the senior chief petty officer. The subsequent investigation found that lax discipline was tolerated on throughout the ship. This led to sloppiness. In particular, the crew did not take all the precautions mandated for passing through a narrow waterway like the Straits of Hormuz. The investigation found many specific errors the crew made, that contributed to the collision. This included supervisors not staying with the sonar operator, who, it turned out, was chatting with someone when the collision (that the sonar would have provided warning about) occurred. The navigator was doing something else, while listening to his iPod, while the officer in charge did not, as he was supposed to do, check the surface with the periscope. The list went on, and ultimately amounted to 30 errors in procedure.

Accidents like these are part of a larger problem in the navy; finding and retaining sailors capable of running a nuclear submarine. Sub commanders are under a lot of pressure to keep their sailors from leaving the navy. But the long periods submarine sailors spend away from their families, creates pressure to get out and take a civilian job close to home. The Hartford had been at sea for five months when it had the accident.

The submarine sailors are very capable, and highly trained, people. Getting a better paying civilian job is not a problem. So sub captains try to keep the crews happy. That often leads to lax discipline. And that often leads to these collisions. Many sub captains see this as a calculated risk, as they know that, in wartime, their highly skilled crews would snap together and do the job. But a sub commanders first priority, at least in peacetime, is the safety of his boat. In wartime, the mission comes first.

There's precedent for this. During the early days of World War II, the U.S. Navy had to replace most of its sub captains. These men had risen to their positions in the peacetime navy by doing things by the book and always adhering to procedure. Moreover, the peacetime sub operations did not include the kind of unexpected, and highly stressful, situation typical of wartime. But in combat, you needed much more flexible commanders, and these were the ones who came in and won the American submarine war in the Pacific. The navy has found that the flood of new technology is creating unexpected situations, that crews have to be warned about, and trained to handle